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BUILDING INSTITUTIONS TO ADDRESS MISCARRIAGES OF 
JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES:  
‘MISSION ACCOMPLISHED’? 
Carole McCartney* & Stephanie Roberts**† 
ABSTRACT 
The revelation of miscarriages of justice can lead a criminal justice 
system to a crisis point, which can be capitalized upon to engineer legal 
reforms. In England and Wales, these reforms have included the 
establishment of three bodies: the Court of Criminal Appeal, the 
Criminal Cases Review Commission, and the Forensic Regulator. With 
differing remits, these institutions are all intended to address 
miscarriages of justice. After outlining the genesis of these bodies, we 
question whether these three institutions are achieving their specific 
goals. This Article then outlines the benefits accrued from the 
establishment of these bodies and the controversies that surround their 
operation. At present, both individually and collectively, these 
institutions represent a partial solution to miscarriages of justice. 
However, this Article argues that calls for a greater focus upon 
“actual” innocence made in light of this partial success are misguided. 
Such a refocusing may have the unintended consequence of fostering a 
climate where miscarriages of justice flourish. The rights of all suspects 
need protection, and due process concerns have the concomitant benefit 
of protecting the innocent from wrongful conviction. A blinkered 
approach to “miscarriages” will not necessarily assist the wrongfully 
convicted and may even increase their number.   
 
 * School of Law, University of Leeds. 
 ** School of Law, University of Westminster. 
 † This article is being published as part of a symposium that took place in April 2011 in 
Cincinnati, Ohio, hosted by the Ohio Innocence Project, entitled The 2011 Innocence Network 
Conference: An International Exploration of Wrongful Conviction. Funding for the symposium was 
provided by The Murray and Agnes Seasongood Good Government Foundation. The articles appearing 
in this symposium range from formal law review style articles to transcripts of speeches that were given 
by the author at the symposium. Therefore, the articles published in this symposium may not comply 
with all standards set forth in Texas Law Review and the Bluebook. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of any criminal justice system should be to ensure the guilty 
are convicted and the innocent acquitted, and that this is done in a lawful 
and just manner. Yet there are a multiplicity of ways in which 
miscarriages of justice1 may occur. The criminal justice system in 
England and Wales, like many other countries, has endured periodic 
crises upon the revelation of wrongful convictions. Such crises have 
often resulted in legal reforms. This Article outlines three: (1) the 
creation of the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1907, (2) the CCRC in 
1995, (3) and the Forensic Regulator Unit in 2007. These bodies each 
have an explicit remit to prevent or correct miscarriages of justice. 
While England and Wales cannot claim, “mission accomplished” with 
regard to addressing miscarriages of justice, the creation of these three 
institutions, with refinement and proper resourcing, deserves 
appreciation. By examining their genesis and remit, judgments regarding 
the effectiveness of these institutions can be made, permitting an 
appraisal of arguments as to whether there should be a greater emphasis 
on innocence within the appellate process. 
A glance at the recent history of criminal justice in England and 
Wales shows a familiar pattern of crisis and reform. The Court of 
Criminal Appeal2 was founded at the start of the twentieth century amid 
“heated press opinion, high profile individual cases of miscarriages of 
justice, a Royal Commission, and a public inquiry.”3 This series of 
events bears a striking similarity to those culminating in the creation of 
the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) after a similar crisis in 
confidence and a Royal Commission at the end of the twentieth century. 
The CCRC was not the only progeny of the 1993 Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice. Although enduring a much longer and more turbulent 
gestational period, the office of the Forensic Regulator was also 
fashioned as a direct response to the same crisis and high profile 
miscarriages of justice, albeit with a remit aimed at prevention rather 
than cure. 
While the Court of Appeal and CCRC both have enabling legislation 
that provides a straightforward encapsulation of their mission and 
 
 1. While there remains some residual debate over the nomenclature, this article uses the phrase 
“wrongful conviction” to indicate the conviction of the factually innocent, and the phrase “miscarriage 
of justice” to encompass a broader category including those who may be factually guilty but were 
convicted unlawfully or in contravention of principles of justice. Reforms in England and Wales have 
always targeted this broader category which is both necessary and in the interests of justice. 
 2. The Court of Criminal Appeal became the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1966. Therefore, the phrases “Court of Criminal Appeal” and “Court of Appeal” 
refer to the same court; the term used is dependent on the time period being referred to. 
 3. RICHARD NOBLES & DAVID SCHIFF, UNDERSTANDING MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 50 (2000). 
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operation, the Forensic Regulator has no statutory basis, making 
discernment of powers and responsibilities more problematic. However, 
all three pose similar problems when it comes to gauging their 
effectiveness. While the Court of Appeal and CCRC produce statistics, 
which give an indication of throughput, these are woefully inadequate 
when measuring their successes in ensuring miscarriages of justice are 
corrected. The Forensic Regulator Unit not only has a more oblique 
remit with no relevant statistics produced, it has also been operational 
for significantly less time, making evaluation more problematic. 
However, observations over the intentions of the regulator and the tools 
at its disposal can be determined and its effectiveness at preventing 
miscarriages of justice postulated. This article will detail the genesis of 
each institution, outlining its role and operation before considering some 
of the criticisms aimed at each and evaluating its effectiveness in 
addressing miscarriages of justice. We start with the oldest institution, 
the Court of Criminal Appeal. 
II. THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL 
The Court of Criminal Appeal’s creation has been described as “the 
product of one of the longest and hardest fought campaigns in the 
history of law reform.”4 It took approximately thirty-one Parliamentary 
bills5 between 1844 and 1906 before the Court of Criminal Appeal was 
created, with judges being the most vocal opponents.6 There are various 
reports from the period that reveal that the judiciary did not object to 
their decisions being reviewed in relation to sentences or questions of 
law, but that they were clearly very hostile to an appeal system based on 
errors of fact.7 Official reports generated from various enquiries into 
alleged wrongful convictions between 1844 and 1906 show that judges 
were reluctant to accept that innocent people were convicted.8 This 
attitude of denial contributed to the delay in setting up the court.9 
 
 4.  JUSTICE COMMITTEE, CRIMINAL APPEALS 6 (1964). 
 5. This is an approximate figure because different sources suggest different numbers but this is 
the figure listed in the Return of Criminal Appeal Bills (1906) H.L. 201.  
 6. See ROSEMARY PATTENDEN, ENGLISH CRIMINAL APPEALS 1844-1994 (1996) at 22–27.  
 7. The views of the judges can be ascertained in the following reports: COMMISSIONERS ON 
CRIMINAL LAW, SECOND REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL LAW (1836), CMND 343; COMMISSIONERS ON 
CRIMINAL LAW, EIGHTH REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL LAW (1845) PARL. PAP, VOL XIV; HOUSE OF LORDS 
SELECT COMMITTEE, REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON AN ACT FOR 
THE FURTHER AMENDMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1848) CMND 523; 
ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE LAW RELATING TO INDICTABLE OFFENCES, REPORT OF THE ROYAL 
COMMISSION ON THE LAW RELATING TO INDICTABLE OFFENCES (1879), CMND 2345. 
 8. See SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT (1848) Id.: Baron Parke, p.4; Lord Denman CJ, p.44; Lord 
Brougham, p.49).  
 9. This view was also shared by the press. THE TIMES, Feb. 2, 1860 (“We believe that in our 
3
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Prior to the creation of the Court of Criminal Appeal, the Home 
Secretary10 had the power to grant a pardon to those suspected of being 
wrongly convicted under the prerogative of mercy. It was believed that a 
Court of Criminal Appeal was then unnecessary as injustice could be 
rectified via this procedure.11 The unsatisfactory nature of this process, 
however, was illustrated by the cases of Adolf Beck and George 
Edalji.12 The Home Office rejected sixteen attempts by Adolf Beck, who 
had been mistaken for the real culprit, to have his convictions for 
defrauding women in 1896 and 1904 reviewed. Widespread press 
coverage led to an inquiry after Beck’s innocence had finally been 
confirmed.13 The case of George Edalji added fuel to the flames. Edalji 
was wrongly convicted of maiming horses in 1903. He had an alibi and 
the crimes had continued while he was in prison awaiting trial. Edalji 
was eventually pardoned after a campaign that included a petition of 
10,000 signatures being sent to the Home Office and newspaper articles 
written by the author Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. These cases and others14 
showed that whilst the pardon power could remedy injustice, an appeal 
process that allowed for errors of fact to be reviewed was also needed. 
The Government responded to this mounting pressure by setting up the 
Court of Criminal Appeal in the Criminal Appeal Act 1907. 
Although the Court of Criminal Appeal was established to remedy 
wrongful convictions of the factually innocent, it has often been opined 
that it has never fulfilled the function intended for it. Difficulties have 
stemmed from its function in deciding appeals on factual error grounds 
where the appellant is arguing he or she did not commit the crime, 
necessarily forcing the Court of Appeal to trespass on the role of the 
jury. The difficulty arises when determining how far it is allowed, or 
should be allowed, to do this. The Court of Appeal has been accused of 
adopting too restrictive an approach to its role of correcting miscarriages 
of justice. Three main complaints have been levelled at the court: that 
too much deference has been shown to the jury verdict;15 that there has 
 
Courts of Justice innocent men never are convicted. If at long intervals some singular exception occurs 
to this universal rule, it is only an exception, which by its extreme rarity proves the rule.”).  
 10. The Home Secretary is Secretary of State for the Home Department which is a Government 
Department responsible for some areas of the English and Welsh criminal justice system, notably the 
police. The other Government Department with responsibility for law and order is the Ministry of 
Justice. 
 11. PATTENDEN, supra note 6, chapter one.  
 12. For details of Beck and Edalji, see C.H. ROLPH, THE QUEEN’S PARDON 36 (1978); 
PATTENDEN, supra note 6, at 27–30. 
 13. BECK INQUIRY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO THE CASE OF ADOLF BECK 
(1904) CMND 2315. 
 14. See PATTENDEN, supra note 6 at 30 n.215 for other examples. 
 15. See R.E. ROSS, THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL (1911); D. Seaborne Davies, The Court of 
Criminal Appeal: The First Forty Years, 1 J. SOC’Y PUB. TCHRS. L. 425 (1951); MICHAEL KNIGHT 
4
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been undue reverence to the principle of finality;16 and that the court is 
motivated by the fear that “opening the floodgates” to a deluge of 
appellants would see the court flounder, ensnared by tight resource and 
budgetary constrictions.17 These factors have undoubtedly had an 
influence on the Court’s working practices and were fundamental in 
establishing the Court as one of review rather than rehearing. This has 
led to problems, particularly for those pleading factual innocence. 
Leave18 of the Court is generally required to appeal, the test being 
whether the appeal is reasonably arguable.19 As Spencer has noted, this 
is “a process which lends itself quite well to the detection of procedural 
and legal errors, but much less well to dealing with the problem that the 
trial court, without breaking any of the rules, just reached the wrong 
result.”20 Whilst the appeal judge may be able to determine from the 
transcript of the summing up whether the trial judge was biased, or 
whether he misdirected the jury on the law, determining whether the 
appellant is factually innocent requires more investigation. As the judge 
reviews the case on paper and usually does so in his evenings and 
weekends, carrying out his normal judicial functions during the day, 
there is the potential for many miscarriages of justice to be missed. This 
process means that very few appeals get through the leave filter and only 
a small fraction of those that do are appeals based on factual innocence. 
The Court suffers from a lack of resources, which is why the leave 
filter is important as the only control the Court has over the number of 
cases appearing before it. Spencer has cited the heavy workload of the 
Court as the main reason for its problems in determining factual 
innocence appeals. He states: 
This institutional overcrowding . . . is the reason, of course, that 
defendants who are convicted in the Crown Court need leave in order to 
 
CRIMINAL APPEALS (1970); K. Malleson, Review of the Appeal Process, RCCJ Research Study No. 17 
(1993); TUCKER COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON NEW TRIALS IN 
CRIMINAL CASES (1954), CMND 9150; JUSTICE COMMITTEE, supra note 4; DONOVAN COMMITTEE, 
REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL (1965) 
CMND 2755 [hereinafter DONOVAN COMMITTEE REPORT]; RUNCIMAN ROYAL COMMISSION ON 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE CHAPTER TEN (1993) CMND 2263 [hereinafter RCCJ]. 
 16. See K. Malleson, Appeals Against Conviction and the Principle of Finality, J.L.S. 151 
(1994); PATTENDEN, supra note 6 73–74; BOB WOFFINDEN, MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 322 (1987); P. 
Hill, Finding Finality, 146 NEW L.J. 1552 (1996). 
 17. See RCCJ, supra note 15, at 162–78; J.R. Spencer, Does Our Present Criminal Appeal 
System Make Sense? CRIM. L. REV. 677 (2006). 
 18. A legal term generally translating as “permission.” 
 19. Lord Justice Auld, Review of the Criminal Courts, chapter 12, ¶ 73 (2001). Available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.criminal-courts-review.org.uk/ (last accessed 
30 November 2012). This process is usually conducted by reading a transcript of the judge’s summing 
up, along with Counsel’s advice on appeal, copies of the trial documents, a list of witnesses and the 
indictment and record sheet.  
 20. Spencer, supra note 17 at 684. 
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appeal. And it is the reason why the Criminal Division of the Court of 
Appeal, like the Court of Criminal Appeal before it, has always done its 
best to avoid getting involved in appeals that turn on disputed facts, and 
particularly those that require the hearing of witnesses: one of the 
consequences of which is that the defendant is in a weak position to 
appeal where he was wrongly convicted (as against convicted in 
proceedings vitiated by an error of procedure or of substantive law). 
Appeals on the basis of “I simply didn’t do it!” are particularly time 
consuming, and if the Court of Appeal were obliged to handle anything 
but a trivial number of them, this would seriously retard the task of 
dealing with appeals against sentence: a task that must be given high 
priority, if the court is to hear the appeal before the sentence is served.21 
The problem of resources has been a recurring issue and impacts on the 
working practices of the Court, as it does on all parts of the criminal 
justice system. But it is not just a heavy workload that causes problems; 
the Court’s review function also causes difficulties for the factually 
innocent. This function was summed up by Blom-Cooper, who stated 
that “[t]he Court of Appeal cannot substitute itself for the jury and re-try 
the case. That is not its function. It must oversee the fairness of the trial 
and satisfy itself that there was evidence on which the jury could 
properly convict.”22 If the Court’s role is merely to assess the fairness of 
the trial and whether the prosecution had satisfied the burden of proof 
and the jury was able to convict, it is very difficult for injustice to be 
rectified. It precludes the Court from delving too deeply into factual 
issues and the merits of a case. The difficulties the review function has 
caused can be illustrated by those appeals that are based on factual error 
grounds where, at its most simplistic level, the appellant is arguing he or 
she did not commit the crime. These are generally the “lurking doubt” 
and fresh evidence grounds of appeal. 
The Criminal Appeal Act 1907 gave the Court wide powers to quash 
a conviction where the verdict was unreasonable or could not be 
supported by the evidence. The approach the Court adopted can be 
illustrated by the case of R v McGrath.23 The then Lord Chief Justice, 
Lord Goddard summed up the attitude of the Court when he said the 
Court was: 
[F]requently asked to reverse verdicts in cases in which a jury has 
rejected an alibi, but this court cannot interfere in those cases in the 
ordinary way, because to do so would be to usurp the function of the jury. 
Where there is evidence on which a jury can act and there has been a 
 
 21. Id. at 693. 
 22. LOUIS BLOM-COOPER, THE BIRMINGHAM SIX AND OTHER CASES: VICTIMS OF 
CIRCUMSTANCE 8–9 (1st ed. 1997). 
 23. R v. McGrath, (1949) 2 All ER 495. 
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proper direction to the jury this court cannot substitute itself for the jury 
and re-try the case. That is not our function.24 
This approach was perceived to be a restrictive one and an illustration of 
deference to the jury verdict. As a result, the Donovan Committee, set 
up to review the Court’s working practices, recommended in 1966 that 
“the verdict . . . was unreasonable and contrary to the weight of the 
evidence” ground should be replaced by giving the Court the power to 
allow an appeal where the verdict is “unsafe or unsatisfactory.”25 The 
Committee felt that the advantages to be gained by this change were that 
the safeguards for an innocent person wrongfully convicted would be 
increased.26 This change was enacted in the Criminal Appeal Act 1966 
and consolidated in the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. 
The aim of Parliament in enacting the unsafe and unsatisfactory 
ground was to impose on the Court a duty to form its own opinion about 
the correctness of a conviction, notwithstanding the fact that no criticism 
could be made of the conduct of the trial. The Court appeared to do this 
shortly after the enactment of the 1968 Act in the case of R v Cooper,27 
which created the lurking doubt ground of appeal. This requires the 
Court to form its own subjective opinion about the evidence in the case. 
Lord Widgery stated: 
[I]n cases of this kind the Court must ask itself a subjective question, 
whether we are content to let the matter stand as it is, or whether there is 
not some lurking doubt in our minds which makes us wonder whether an 
injustice has been done. This is a reaction which may not be based strictly 
on the evidence as such; it is a reaction which can be produced by the 
general feel of the case as the Court experiences it.28 
Despite the enactment of the unsafe and unsatisfactory ground and Lord 
Widgery’s seemingly liberal interpretation of it, the review function 
continues to hamper the criminal division’s approach in those appeals 
where there is no procedural or legal irregularity and no fresh evidence. 
Malleson’s study29 of the first 300 appeals of 1990 revealed that the 
principle of lurking doubt was directly or indirectly raised in 10 of the 
281 appeals that were finally decided. She concluded that the Court 
appears to regard the principle as a last resort for those cases where no 
criticism can be made of the trial, yet concern about the justice of the 
conviction still lingers. 
Malleson’s research was carried out for the Royal Commission on 
 
24. Id. at 496. 
25. DONOVAN COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 15, at ¶ 150. 
 26. Id. 
 27. R v. Cooper, (1969) 1 Q.B. 267. 
28. Id. at 271. 
 29. Malleson, supra note 15. 
7
McCartney and Roberts: Building Institutions to Address Miscarriages of Justice in Engla
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
1340 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80 
Criminal Justice (RCCJ), which was established on the day the 
Birmingham Six were freed30 and it proposed reforms to the appeal 
process with the aim of restoring public confidence. The Commission 
discussed the lurking doubt ground and stated that they “fully 
appreciate[d] the reluctance felt by judges sitting in the Court of Appeal 
about quashing a jury’s verdict” as “the jury has seen all the witnesses 
and heard their evidence; the Court of Appeal has not.”31 The majority 
recommended that there should be a single ground of appeal which was 
whether a conviction “is or may be unsafe.” The Government rejected 
the words “or may be” preferring the test to be simply “is unsafe” which 
was enacted in the Criminal Appeal Act 1995.32 In their response to the 
RCCJ, the Government stated that the concept of lurking doubt was 
incorporated into the unsafe ground.33 This was confirmed by an update 
of Malleson’s research by Roberts using the first 300 appeals of 2002 
which revealed that the principle of lurking doubt was referred to 
directly or indirectly in seven of the 300 appeals with one allowed and 
six dismissed or refused.34 Therefore, although lurking doubt has 
arguably been incorporated into “unsafe,” the position under the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1995 is not markedly different to that under the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 with the Court continuing to adopt a 
restrictive approach to these appeals despite the recommendations of the 
RCCJ. 
Although the general consensus has been that the reluctance of the 
judges to usurp the role of the jury has inhibited their use of the lurking 
doubt ground of appeal, the RCCJ report highlighted the deficiencies of 
the Court’s review function. This was illustrated by the late, former 
Court of Appeal judge Sir Frederick Lawton, who stated: 
The court does not re-try cases . . . . It has to proceed on the basis that 
findings of fact implicit in the jury’s verdict are the facts of the case. It 
can only disregard them if there is new evidence, or the findings of the 
jury were perverse, or the court has a lurking doubt. Reading a transcript 
of evidence is not conducive to raising a lurking doubt.35 
This explains why very few lurking doubt appeals manage to get 
 
 30. This case and the RCCJ report are discussed infra. 
 31. RCCJ, supra note 15, at 171–72 ¶ 46. 
 32. This is the current test the Court has to quash convictions. Section 2(1) of the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1995 states that the Court of Appeal (a) “shall allow an appeal against conviction if they 
think that the conviction is unsafe; and (b) shall dismiss such an appeal in any other case.” 
 33. LORD CHANCELLOR’S DEP’T, ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE: FINAL 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE (1996).  
 34. S. Roberts, The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice and Factual Innocence: Remedying 
Wrongful Convictions in the Court of Appeal, 1 JUST. J. 86 (2004). 
 35. Frederick Lawton, Judgments Without Prejudice, THE TIMES, Oct. 23, 1990. 
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through the leave filter and why they are generally unsuccessful,36 thus 
curtailing the opportunities for those who are factually innocent to 
overturn their convictions.  
Although it may have been the intention of Parliament that the Court 
of Criminal Appeal would take an active role in reassessing evidence, 
giving the Court wide powers under section 9 of the Criminal Appeal 
Act 1907 to adduce fresh evidence, the Court imposed its own 
restrictions: the evidence had to be credible and relevant to the issue of 
guilt; the evidence had to be admissible; and the evidence could not 
have been put before the jury.37 Whilst these criteria were partly due to 
deference to the jury verdict and the principle of finality, the third 
restriction directly relates to the review function. In 1966, the Donovan 
Committee acknowledged that if fresh evidence were admitted, there 
would be a risk that the Court would on occasions find itself retrying a 
case, which was “a function which Parliament did not intend it to 
discharge.”38 The Committee recommended that additional evidence 
should be received if it was relevant and credible, and if there was a 
reasonable explanation for the failure to place it before the jury.39 These 
recommendations were the subject of a late amendment to the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1966 which then became Section 23 of the Criminal Appeal 
Act 1968. The RCCJ also heard evidence from a variety of witnesses 
about problems relating to fresh evidence appeals and made various 
recommendations later incorporated into Section 23 of the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1968 by Section 4 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995. 
The Court now has the power to hear fresh evidence where this is 
“necessary or expedient in the interests of justice”40 and must have 
regard to four factors: (a) whether the evidence appears to the Court to 
be “capable of belief;” (b) “whether . . . the evidence may afford any 
ground for allowing the appeal;” (c) whether the evidence would have 
been admissible in the lower court on an issue which is the subject of the 
appeal; and (d) whether there is a reasonable explanation for the failure 
to adduce the evidence in those proceedings.41 There is evidence to 
suggest, however, that the Court’s attitude towards fresh evidence 
appeals since the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 remains unchanged.42 
 
 36. For a further discussion on the problems of lurking doubt appeals specifically, see L. Leigh, 
Lurking Doubt and the Safety of Convictions, CRIM. L. REV. 809 (2006) L. James, Criminal Appeals and 
the Lurking Doubt 154(49) J.P. 780 (1990).  
 37. These principles from the early cases are summed up in R v. Parks, (1961) 1 W.L.R. 1484.  
 38. DONOVAN COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 15, ¶ 132. 
 39. Id. ¶ 136. 
 40. Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, § 23 (U.K.). 
 41. Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, § 23(2) (U.K.), as amended by Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, 
c. 35, § 4 (U.K.). 
 42. See Roberts, supra note 34. 
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Fresh evidence appeals illustrate the complexity of the relationship 
between the Court and the jury. The Court defers to the jury verdict 
because an appeal is not a rehearing of witnesses (the jury is meant to be 
in a better position to draw inferences regarding witness testimony than 
the Court of Appeal), and the task of deciding whether a defendant is 
factually guilty is legally given to the jury. The review function also 
hampers the Court of Appeal from assessing fresh evidence as the Court 
is assessing whether the jury could have convicted and not whether it 
should have convicted. Yet the Court of Appeal’s deference to the jury 
verdict is difficult to comprehend in fresh evidence appeals, because the 
Court is deciding on evidence never put before a jury. How should it 
then decide on guilt when this is not within its defined role? A lack of 
clarity on this issue compounds the difficulties that face the factually 
innocent and explains why so few fresh evidence appeals are brought 
before the Court and why so few are successful, forcing the innocent to 
frame their appeals in technicalities or procedural irregularities. 
The resulting emphasis on procedural and technical appeals does 
assist those factually innocent appellants who have such irregularities or 
“due process” failures in their case. Due process arguments thus have an 
important role to play in providing factually innocent appellants with 
grounds of appeal. The problem arises when factually innocent 
appellants do not have due process failures to argue or when these 
arguments are unsuccessful in gaining relief. Such appellants are then 
forced to negotiate the flaws of fresh evidence appeals or locate a new 
procedural irregularity to try again. This is not an easy task even though 
the creation of the CCRC was heralded as the “solution” to such issues. 
This body was intended to have the power and resources to undertake 
investigations and possibly locate new facts (admissible fresh evidence) 
or shed new light on previously argued facts, capabilities that the Court 
of Appeal does not have. These capabilities, however, have meant that 
the relationship between the Court of Appeal and the CCRC has proved 
to be difficult, as those cases sent to the Court of Appeal via the CCRC 
can accentuate the very difficulties that the Court of Appeal has in 
handling fresh evidence appeals. The CCRC itself has also been subject 
of criticism in relation to its ability to deal with factually innocent 
appellants, particularly because the origins of the CCRC also lay in 
crisis following the revelation of a series of high profile wrongful 
convictions. 
III. THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION 
The origins of the CCRC lay in continued failures of Home 
Secretaries to use their powers wisely as well as frustrations with the 
10
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remit and operation of the Court of Appeal. The Home Secretary was 
given an additional power by Section 19 of the Criminal Appeal Act 
1907 to refer a case back to the Court of Appeal for determination of the 
prerogative of mercy. The Criminal Justice Act 1948,43 however, 
severed the link between the referral power and the prerogative of 
mercy, which left the Home Secretary with the power to grant a pardon 
or to refer a case to the Court of Appeal for determination. The Home 
Secretary also had the option of commissioning an inquiry into a case, 
which was carried out independently from the Court. Section 19 of the 
1907 Act became Section 17 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, allowing 
the Home Secretary to refer a case to the Court “if he thinks fit.”  
The problems associated with this process were highlighted in 1975 
when the then Home Secretary Roy Jenkins referred the Lattimore44 
case back to the Court of Appeal. This was the first of a number of cases 
during the 1970s where the appellants were believed innocent. Three 
young boys, Colin Lattimore, Ahmet Salih, and Ronnie Leighton, were 
convicted of crimes leading to the death of Maxwell Confait, and after 
leave to appeal was refused, a campaign was launched on their behalf.45 
Their convictions were subsequently overturned and an inquiry into the 
case found serious police malpractice during the investigation.46 The 
publicity surrounding this case contributed to calls for a Royal 
Commission on Criminal Procedure (RCCP), which made a subsequent 
legislative recommendation to codify police powers, leading to the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
During the 1970s there was also hostility to references by the Home 
Secretary to the Court of Appeal, illustrated by the notorious case of 
Cooper and McMahon.47 Cooper, McMahon, and another man Murphy 
were convicted of murder. The case went to appeal in February 1971 
and was dismissed. The case was referred back to the Court, and in 
November 1973 Murphy’s conviction was quashed. Home Secretary 
Roy Jenkins then referred the case of Cooper and McMahon back to the 
Court in 1974, and the case was rejected. After public disquiet and 
media concern escalated, the case was referred back to the Court again 
in 1976, and failed, while a fifth referral to the Court was rejected by 
Lord Widgery. A month after publication of a book on the case by 
Ludovic Kennedy, the Home Secretary William Whitelaw remitted 
 
 43. Criminal Justice Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 49, § 38(6) (U.K.). 
 44. R v. Lattimore, (1976) 62 Cr. App. R. 53 (U.K.). 
 45. See CHRISTOPHER PRICE & JONATHAN CAPLAN, THE CONFAIT CONFESSIONS (1977). 
 46. HENRY FISHER, REPORT OF AN INQUIRY BY THE HONOURABLE SIR HENRY FISHER INTO THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE TRIAL OF THREE PERSONS ON CHARGES ARISING OUT OF THE DEATH 
OF MAXWELL CONFAIT AND THE FIRE AT 27 DOGGETT ROAD, LONDON SE6 (1977). 
 47. WOFFINDEN, supra note 16. 
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Cooper and McMahon’s sentences, and they were released from prison. 
However, the case was referred back to the Court of Appeal for the sixth 
time in 2003; the convictions were finally quashed, but by then both had 
died.48 
The cases of Laszlo Virag and Luke Dougherty also raised concerns. 
In 1974, a free pardon had been given to Virag, and Dougherty’s 
conviction had been quashed by the Court of Appeal. The Home 
Secretary announced in the House of Commons that, in view of the 
serious questions raised by these two cases, he had appointed a 
committee, headed by Lord Devlin, to look into the law and Home 
Office procedures. The report, published in 1976,49 was highly critical of 
the Home Office’s practices in the Virag case, which had meant a two-
year delay in his release because of the “serious misjudgment of the 
importance of the case by the officer who first dealt with it, coupled 
with the fact that officers in the Division were under exceptional 
pressures due to staff shortages.”50 
There continued to be disquiet about Home Office procedures into the 
1980s. A series of television programmes about wrongful convictions 
were broadcast on the BBC in April 1982, featuring individuals who had 
petitioned the Home Office for referral to the Court of Appeal. These 
BBC programmes, entitled Rough Justice, provoked a great deal of 
interest, including from the House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee.51 The Committee heard oral evidence concerning these 
cases and others from Home Office officials, representatives of the 
human rights organisation JUSTICE, and the Criminal Bar Association 
(CBA). The Home Affairs Committee subsequently reported that both 
JUSTICE and the CBA had suggested that the chances of a successful 
petition to the Home Secretary might sometimes depend less on the 
intrinsic merits of the case than on the amount of external support and 
publicity it was able to attract. The report referred to Lord Devlin’s 
proposal in 1976 for an independent review tribunal, stating that the 
proposal had been rejected by the Home Office on the grounds that the 
existence of a body would have detracted from the Home Secretary’s 
freedom to reach decisions and that it would in practice operate as 
“another court above the Court of Appeal.”52 
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeal continued to be hostile to Home 
 
 48. R v. Cooper [2003] EWCA Crim 2257.  
 49. DEVLIN COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE OF 
IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1976) HC 338. 
 50. Id. ¶ 6.17 
 51. HOUSE OF COMMONS HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, SIXTH REPORT, MISCARRIAGES OF 
JUSTICE, (1981-82) HC 421. 
 52. Id. ¶ 12.  
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Secretary references, and calls persisted for an independent review 
tribunal. On June 16, 1988, a motion was debated in the House of 
Commons to establish an independent review body, but it lost by 121 
votes to 45.53 The real catalyst for change proved to be the cases of the 
Guildford Four and the Birmingham Six.  
The “Guildford Four,” wrongly believed to be members of the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), had been convicted of the murders of five 
people in 1975 who died in the Guildford and Woolwich pub bombings. 
Their first appeal just two years later was heard after convicted IRA 
terrorists confessed to carrying out the pub bombings. This appeal 
failed. The case garnered a great deal of public interest, featuring in a 
number of books and television programmes, and the Home Secretary 
referred their case back to the Court of Appeal in 1989 after a persuasive 
campaign by a number of Members of Parliament, House of Lords 
peers, and two former Law Lords, Devlin and Scarman. New evidence 
showed confession evidence had been fabricated, and the Director of 
Public Prosecutions stated that the Crown no longer wished to maintain 
the convictions.54 The Court of Appeal consequently quashed the 
convictions. The “Birmingham Six” were also believed to be part of the 
IRA and were similarly convicted of murder in 1975, this time for the 
Birmingham pub bombings. They had two failed appeals in 1976 and 
1988, and as a result of public pressure surrounding this and the 
Guildford Four case, the Home Secretary referred the case to appeal in 
1991. The Director of Public Prosecutions again stated that the Crown 
no longer wished to maintain the convictions, but the Court of Appeal 
heard the appeal in full. After hearing evidence that confessions had 
been tampered with and that there were serious flaws in the forensic 
evidence, the Court quashed the convictions.55 
A number of other “Irish terrorism” convictions were overturned at 
this time, including those of the “Maguire Seven.” The Home Secretary 
referred this case to appeal in 1990, and the convictions were overturned 
largely on the basis of nondisclosure of evidence and the discrediting of 
forensic evidence. They had all served their sentences by this time and 
one of them, Giuseppe Conlon, father of Gerard Conlon, who himself 
was one of the Guildford Four, had died.56 The conviction of Judith 
 
 53. B. Woffinden, The Independent Review Tribunal, NEW L.J. 1108–09 (1989).  
 54. See WOFFINDEN, supra note 16; GERRY CONLON, PROVED INNOCENT: THE STORY OF GERRY 
CONLON OF THE GUILDFORD FOUR (1990); PAUL HILL & RONAN BENNETT, STOLEN YEARS: BEFORE 
AND AFTER GUILDFORD (1990); Clive Walker, Miscarriages of Justice in Principle and Practice, in 
MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF JUSTICE IN ERROR 31 (Clive Walker & Keir Starmer eds., 
1999); NOBLES & SCHIFF, supra note 3.; PATTENDEN, supra note 6. 
 55. See BLOM-COOPER, supra note 22; WOFFINDEN, supra note 16; CHRIS MULLIN, ERROR OF 
JUDGMENT: THE BIRMINGHAM BOMBINGS (1986). 
 56. See ANNIE MAGUIRE & JIM GALLAGHER, WHY ME? (1994). 
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Ward, who had been tried in 1974 for the twelve deaths resulting from 
the bombing of a British Army coach, was also overturned in 1992 after 
forensic evidence was discredited and a large amount of material never 
disclosed to the defence was discovered. Her confessions were also 
deemed unreliable due to mental incapacity.57 
The case of the Guildford Four led to an inquiry by Lord Justice 
May.58 Such an inquiry was time-consuming (taking four and a half 
years), expensive, and of course hugely embarrassing to the government 
and law enforcement authorities. The government clearly did not desire 
a thorough inquiry, then, into each further miscarriage of justice as they 
came to light, so the Birmingham Six and Judith Ward cases were never 
examined in any depth. Although a Royal Commission on Criminal 
Justice (RCCJ), chaired by Lord Runciman, was announced as a direct 
response, the Commission did not confine itself to the issues set out in 
the terms of reference and instead took an expansive view of their remit, 
extending almost to the entire criminal process.59 As previously 
discussed, the RCCJ reporting in 1993, recommended changing the 
Court of Appeal’s powers to quash convictions and amending the fresh 
evidence provisions in Section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. The 
major change however, was the recommendation that a new body should 
be created to consider alleged miscarriages of justice, to supervise their 
investigation if further inquiries are needed, and to refer cases to the 
Court of Appeal. The CCRC was subsequently created in the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1995 and began work on April 1, 1997. 
The principal reason for establishing a new body was the need for 
decisions to be made independently of the executive. To ensure this, the 
Criminal Appeal Act provides that the CCRC “shall not be regarded as 
the servant or agent of the Crown.”60 However, the Commission’s 
connection with the Government is not completely severed, as the 
Commissioners are appointed by the Queen on the recommendation of 
the Prime Minister.61 One-third of the Commissioners must be legally 
qualified62 and at least two thirds of the members of the Commission 
“shall be persons who appear to the Prime Minister to have knowledge 
or experience of any aspect of the criminal justice system.”63 The 
Commission is also reliant upon the Ministry of Justice for resources 
 
 57. See JUDITH WARD, AMBUSHED (1993). 
 58. SIR JOHN MAY, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE 
CONVICTIONS ARISING OUT OF THE BOMB ATTACKS IN GUILDFORD AND WOOLWICH IN 1974 (1990) 
H.C. 556.  
 59. RCCJ, supra note 15, at 162–78. 
 60. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 8(2) (U.K.). 
 61. Id. § 8(4) (U.K.). 
 62. Id. § 8(5) (U.K.). 
 63. Id. § 8(6) (U.K.). 
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and the Ministry sets the terms and conditions of the Commission 
members’ employment. 
Under the Criminal Appeal Act, the Commission has the power to 
require an “appropriate person” from the public body that carried out the 
original investigation to appoint an investigating officer to carry out 
inquiries.64 Where the public body was a police force, the appropriate 
person will be the Chief Constable of that force.65 This has proved 
controversial. Malet has argued that the Act takes a very trusting attitude 
towards the police by leaving the police to examine their own failings.66 
A related problem is that the police must finance the cost of the 
reinvestigation. The majority of investigations and case reviews are 
undertaken by CCRC Case Review Managers, who write a report and 
make a recommendation that is sent to Commissioners to review. If the 
case is to be rejected (i.e., not sent for a further appeal), then a 
Commissioner alone can review the report and decide. A panel of three 
Commissioners is required to decide that the case should be referred 
back to the Court of Appeal. 
Eligibility for review depends on whether the application arises from 
a conviction in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland. Only in 
exceptional circumstances can a case be referred without the applicant 
having exhausted the normal appeals process. To refer a case to the 
Court of Appeal, the Commission is given statutory guidance under 
Section 13, which states that there must be a “real possibility” arising 
from an argument or evidence that was not raised during the trial or at 
appeal, or from “exceptional circumstances,”67 that the conviction or 
sentence would not be upheld.68 The exceptional circumstances, a late 
insertion after a lengthy campaign, remain defined on a case-by-case 
basis. These statutory provisions appear more restrictive than the power 
the Home Secretary had to refer cases “if he thinks fit.” It is difficult to 
define what real possibility means but the late Supreme Court judge, 
Lord Bingham, stated that a real possibility “plainly denotes a 
contingency which, in the Commission’s judgment, is more than an 
outside chance or a bare possibility, but which may be less than a 
probability or a likelihood or a racing certainty.”69 
While the CCRC is widely accepted to be an improvement on the 
 
 64. Id. § 19(1) (U.K.). 
 65. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 22(4) (U.K.). 
 66. D. Malet, The New Regime for the Correction of Miscarriages of Justice, Part 2 159(44) J.P. 
735 (1995) at 736. 
 67. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35 (U.K.). 
 68. Id. at 13(1)(a), (b) (U.K.); Criminal Appeal Act 1995, 1995, c. 35, § 13(2), (U.K.) 
(explaining that the Commission may require the Chief Constable to appoint the investigating officer 
from his own force or another.). 
 69. R v. CCRC Ex Parte Pearson, (2000) 1 Cr. App. R. 141, 149. 
15
McCartney and Roberts: Building Institutions to Address Miscarriages of Justice in Engla
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
1348 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80 
Home Secretary’s reference procedure, there are major difficulties in 
assessing its performance. The Commission receives 800 to 1000 
applications annually and refers around 4 percent of completed cases to 
appeal. It is argued that a 4 percent referral rate is too low, but it remains 
problematic to state that more cases should be referred without 
examining them in more detail; it is also difficult to provide anything 
more than anecdotal evidence, emanating from those who have been 
rejected, that more cases should be referred back to appeal. It is clear 
that the Commission is referring far more cases than the Home Office, 
which referred 67 cases between 1980 and 1993,70 but this is to be 
expected given the increased budget and manpower. If the 
Commission’s referral rate were not significantly better than the Home 
Office, then serious questions would have to be asked about its 
competence. In crude statistical terms, Nobles and Schiff calculated that 
in 2006–2007, the Commission made a contribution of 0.058 percent to 
the total successful appeals against conviction and sentence.71 If using 
these figures to measure the Commission’s contribution to remedying 
wrongful convictions and sentences, the contribution appears 
insignificant. 
The Commission’s “success” rate at the Court of Appeal has also 
been the subject of controversy. As of May 2013, there were 528 CCRC 
referrals to the Court of Appeal, and 498 had been heard. Of those, 341 
had been quashed and 145 had been upheld.72 This represents a success 
rate of 60.8 percent of those appeals heard by the Court (341/528). 
When calculated in terms of cases that have been closed (15,199), the 
Commission has won a further appeal in just over 2 percent of eligible 
cases. The difficulty for the Commission is if the success rate at appeal 
is too high, it appears that the Commission has set a prohibitive 
threshold for referral by sending only those certain to win. However, if 
the successful appeal rate is too low, then it appears that the 
Commission is sending weak cases with little chance of success, 
irritating the Court of Appeal. This balancing act was outlined in a 
memorandum to the House of Commons Justice Committee: 
The Commission has accordingly had to tread a careful line between not, 
automatically, referring all but the most threadbare cases (so as not to 
 
 70. PATTENDEN, supra note 6. 
 71. Richard Nobles & David Schiff, After Ten Years: An Investment in Justice? in THE 
CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION: HOPE FOR THE INNOCENT 151, 152–53 (Michael Naughton ed., 
2010). This figure is based on 33 referrals which succeeded at the Court of Appeal out of 2000 
successful appeals against conviction and sentence. The 0.058 per cent figure is the total successful 
Commission referrals (33) out of 57,000 people found guilty and sentenced in the Crown Court. 
 72. See the CRIM. CASES REV. COMM’N Case Library which is available on the Ministry of 
Justice website at http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/criminal-cases-review-commission/case-library (last 
accessed 27 June 2013). 
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burden the courts with a mass of hopeless appeals) and not being so 
cautious as to refer only those cases where it judges the applicants 
prospect of success on appeal is more or less assured.73 
There are other areas where the Commission has been criticised and 
these criticisms can be divided into two broad areas. The first is its 
working practices and backlog of cases; the second is its lack of focus 
on those who are factually innocent.  
Since the Commission’s inception, it has been besieged by problems 
of funding, delays, and backlogs.74 Initially, the Commission was a 
victim of its own success as large numbers applied; additionally, 279 
cases were transferred from the Home Office, which were prioritised by 
the Commission. The First Report of the Home Affairs Select 
Committee in 1998–1999, which scrutinised the work of the 
Commission, reported that there was a two-year delay before cases were 
reviewed.75 As a result of this backlog, the Commission was given an 
enlarged budget of £1.28 million to increase the number of Case Review 
Managers from twenty-eight to forty during 1999–2000 and to fifty 
during 2000–2001. The move proved to have an impact on cases 
awaiting review, which dropped from 1,208 in May 1999 to 211 by 
March 31, 2004.76 However, the Commission’s funding was reduced 
from £7.8 million in 2004 to £5.75 million in 2005, which coincided 
with the largest increase in applications for five years. This prompted 
the then Chairman Professor Graham Zellick to report in the 2005–2006 
Annual Report that due to budget restraints, backlogs and waiting times 
had increased.77  
 
 73. See CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, MEMORANDUM, 2009, H.C. 343 (U.K.), available 
at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmjust/343/9031004.htm (last 
accessed 28 November 2012). 
 74. See A. James, N. Taylor & and C. Walker, The Criminal Cases Review Commission: 
Economy, Effectiveness and Justice, CRIM. L. REV. 140 (2000); R. Nobles & D. Schiff, The Criminal 
Cases Review Commission: Reporting Success, 64 MOD. L. REV. 280 (2001); Clive Walker & Carole 
McCartney, Criminal Justice and Miscarriages of Justice in England and Wales, in WRONGFUL 
CONVICTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 183 (C. Ronald Huff & 
Martin Killias eds., 2008). 
 75. HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, FIRST REPORT: THE WORK OF THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW 
COMMISSION, 1998-9, H.C. 106 (U.K.), available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmhaff/106/10602.htm (last accessed 27 November 2012). The 
CCRC was originally under the remit of the Home Office and therefore subject to the scrutiny of the 
Home Affairs Select Committee. It is now under the remit of the Ministry of Justice and so under the 
scrutiny of the House of Commons Justice Committee.  
 76. CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT & ACCOUNTS, 2003–2004, H.C. 9 
(U.K.). Available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110215111039/http://www.ccrc. 
gov.uk/CCRC_Uploads/2003%20-%202004_AnnualReport.pdf (last accessed 1 December 2012). 
 77. CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT & ACCOUNTS, 2005-2006, H.C. 1290 
(U.K.). Available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110215111039/http://www. 
ccrc.gov.uk/CCRC_Uploads/Annual%20Report%202005%20-%202006.pdf (last accessed 1 December 
2012). 
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In a bid to streamline, the Commission changed its working practices 
in 2006, which are set out in its annual report. These changes appear to 
be having a positive impact on the Commission’s backlog despite 
further reductions in funding. In giving evidence to the House of 
Commons Justice Committee on March 10, 2009, the current Chairman, 
Richard Foster, stated that there were seventy-eight cases waiting to be 
allocated to a case review manager (down from 225 in March 2006) and 
that complex cases now had a twenty-week wait (down from twenty-one 
months in 2005). He stated that quicker allocation of cases had reduced 
the backlog and that approximately eighty-five percent of cases were 
resolved within twelve months.78 However, the reduction in funding has 
also led to a reduction in Case Review Managers of thirty percent over 
the period 2005–2011, a cut necessary to prevent a projected funding 
gap of £1.8 million by 2010–2011. The reductions have also forced the 
Commission to cut the number of Commissioners from sixteen to 
eleven. Unless funding increases (which is highly unlikely), the 
Commission runs the risk of struggling to keep waiting times and 
backlogs in check, with cases potentially cursorily reviewed and 
possibly rejected too swiftly. 
The Commission has further been criticised for its lack of focus on 
factual innocence. These criticisms largely relate to its role which is to 
‘review the cases of those that feel they have been wrongly convicted of 
criminal offences, or unfairly sentenced. We consider whether there is 
new evidence or argument that may cast doubt on the safety of an 
original decision.’79 
This perceived lack of focus on innocence was explained by former 
Chairman Professor Graham Zellick who stated that: 
[T]o deal only with people who are innocent—even if they could be 
identified—would not . . . widen our role, but would greatly narrow 
it . . . . What of the principle of legality, of due process and of the 
integrity of the criminal justice process? We think these things are rather 
important, as does the Court of Appeal.80 
The Court of Appeal has the power to overturn convictions if it 
considers the conviction to be “unsafe.” There are currently two 
interpretations of unsafe: that a factually innocent person has been 
wrongly convicted, or a factually guilty person has been convicted but 
 
 78. Examination of Witnesses, JUSTICE COMMITTEE, Q6 & Q7, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmjust/343/9031001.htm (last accessed 1 
December 2012). 
 79. See CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N: OUR ROLE (OVERVIEW), http://webarchive. 
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110215111039/http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/about/about_27.htm (last accessed 2 
December 2012). 
 80. Graham Zellick, Letter to the Editor, THE GUARDIAN, June 20, 2005. 
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there has been a serious procedural or legal error or illegality.81 The 
Court’s approach is summed up in R v Hickey and others, where Roch 
LJ stated: 
This court is not concerned with the guilt or innocence of the appellants; 
but only with the safety of their convictions . . . . [T]he integrity of the 
criminal process is the most important consideration for courts which 
have to hear appeals against conviction. Both the innocent and the guilty 
are entitled to fair trials.82 
The Commission can refer a case where there is a real possibility that it 
will not be upheld, which means it refers cases under both 
interpretations of unsafe. Its work is thus not restricted to just those who 
maintain innocence and as a result, the Commission’s approach has been 
criticised: 
The CCRC’s dependence on the criteria of the appeal courts has the 
knock-on effect that its reviews are merely safety checks on the 
lawfulness or otherwise of criminal convictions, as opposed to the kind of 
in-depth inquisitorial investigations . . . that seek the truth of the claims of 
innocence by alleged victims of miscarriages of justice in the way that 
was expected by the RCCJ.83 
As a result of this perceived reluctance of the CCRC to involve itself in 
“innocence” claims, Naughton states that there is then a need for a body 
that, “unlike the CCRC, is not bound to the criteria of the appeal courts 
and is sufficiently resourced and empowered so that it is not dependent 
on government,”84 although he does not explain how such a body would 
be funded or operate. In defence of the CCRC’s position, David Jessel, a 
former CCRC Commissioner, has responded that: 
[F]ewer innocent people would be freed if the legal criterion was 
provable innocence rather than unsafety of conviction, if only because it 
is so damnably difficult to prove. Is this what the campaigners want? If 
so,  be careful what you wish for . . . . [T]o consider the safety of a 
conviction provides a sterner test for the system and a more useful one for 
the  innocent individual than any test for factual innocence alone ever 
could.85 
 
 81. For a discussion on the two interpretations of unsafe, see S. Roberts, ‘Unsafe’ Convictions: 
Defining and Compensating Miscarriages of Justice, 66 MOD. L. REV. 441 (2003). 
 82. Court of Appeal, unreported, transcript 30 July 2007. 
 83. Michael Naughton, Conclusion, in THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION: HOPE FOR 
THE INNOCENT? 233 (Michael Naughton ed., 2010). 
 84. Id. at 225. 
 85. David Jessel, Innocence or Safety: Why the Wrongly Convicted are Better Served by Safety, 
THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 15, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/dec/15/prisons-and-
probation (last accessed 2 December 2012); See Hannah Quirk, Identifying Miscarriages of Justice: Why 
Innocence in the UK is Not the Answer, 70 MOD. L. REV. 759 (2007).  
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There are a number of points to be made in relation to this. The Court of 
Appeal has always proven more receptive to appeals based on 
procedural or legal errors (“due process” failures) than those based on 
factual innocence as previously discussed. Therefore, if the Commission 
believes there is a greater chance of success with a procedural or 
technical ground of appeal, then it is going to increase its chances of 
success when referring on that basis. This benefits those who are 
factually innocent, those who are most often seriously hampered by the 
“invisibility” of their innocence: “[I]nnocence is not something that 
exists, out there, to be touched, felt, or measured, any more than guilt.”86 
To demand proof of factual innocence as a threshold for appellants 
would raise the bar to a prohibitive level and would inhibit further the 
CCRC—particularly at their initial stage of review. This is where 
procedural and legal issues are critical, as these are often visible on the 
face of documents and materials initially reviewed, rather than buried 
deep in a case, requiring significant investigation to uncover. 
Downgrading the importance of due process arguments would be 
unworkable in practice, and it should be the role of an appellate court to 
uphold the integrity of the trial process and protect the right to a fair 
trial, which is conducted according to law, regardless of guilt or 
innocence. 
Applications relying on a claim of factual innocence often do not 
have a legal or procedural error, or if they did, those arguments would 
have been made at the first appeal. The difficulty then arises in locating 
fresh evidence. Whilst the CCRC can be criticised for taking too 
restrictive an approach when deciding that evidence would not pass the 
fresh evidence provisions in Section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 
1968,87 many of the CCRC’s problems are in fact created by the 
approach of the Court of Appeal. This is, of course, exacerbated by the 
subservient position of the Commission in relation to the Court of 
Appeal. If the Court takes a restrictive approach to fresh evidence, then 
it is understandable to some extent that the Commission will also. A 
simple solution is to abolish the fresh evidence restrictions in Section 23 
of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, which would give the Commission 
more flexibility. This would also allow compelling evidence of factual 
innocence that was available at the trial and the first appeal to be 
referred back to the Court. 
Whilst the Commission can perhaps be criticised for being too 
 
 86. R. Nobles & D. Schiff, Guilt and Innocence in the Criminal Justice System: A Comment on 
R (Mullen) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 69 MOD. L. REV. 80, 91 (2006). 
 87. See Campbell Malone, Only the Freshest Will Do, in THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW 
COMM’N: HOPE FOR THE INNOCENT? 107, 109 (Michael Naughton ed., 2010). 
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cautious in its relationship to the Court of Appeal,88 there is little point 
in having a body such as the CCRC referring cases without regard to the 
powers and procedures of the Court of Appeal. Therefore, it is perhaps 
better to look to reforming the Court of Appeal to make that institution 
more receptive to factual innocence claims. An alternative solution, as 
Naughton suggests, would be to make more use of the pardon power, 
which the Minister of Justice may still exercise when convinced of a 
person’s innocence.89 A pardon removes the punishment for the crime, 
which is obviously beneficial to those imprisoned; however, there is the 
potential for creation of a “two-tier” appellate system, with a Court of 
Appeal rectifying procedural and legal errors and the Minister of Justice 
dealing with cases of factual innocence. This takes us full circle to the 
constitutional problems that led to the removal of the Home Secretary’s 
referral power and the creation of the CCRC. The pardon power also 
does not remove the conviction, which only the Court of Appeal has the 
power to do. This is illustrated by the notorious case of Derek Bentley 
who was executed for murder in 1953. After a prolonged campaign by 
his sister, he was eventually pardoned in 1993, but his case had to return 
to the Court of Appeal in 1998 before the conviction was finally 
overturned.90 Therefore, making more use of the pardon power is not 
necessarily a solution to these problems. 
The CCRC was not the only progeny of the 1993 Royal Commission 
on Criminal Justice. While the creation of the CCRC could be 
considered a relatively swift and necessary reaction to the failings of the 
appellate process, there was also consideration of the causes of the 
miscarriages of justice that had necessitated the Royal Commission. The 
so-called Irish terrorism wrongful convictions had brought to the fore 
the issue of expert evidence and flawed forensic science. Many of the 
cases had been characterised by an early reliance upon false test results 
stating that the individuals had been in contact with explosives. The 
RCCJ looked then at the issue of forensic science and the use of experts 
during the criminal process and found that there were no real checks and 
balances in place to prevent reliance upon flawed forensic science or 
charlatans. This prompted recommendations that were preventative in 
nature, although these reforms were to take considerably longer to be 
acted upon.  
 
 88. See R. Nobles & D. Schiff, The Criminal Cases Review Commission: Establishing a 
Workable Relationship with the Court of Appeal, CRIM. L. REV. 173 (2005); Walker and McCartney, 
supra note 74.  
 89. The Home Secretary previously had the power to grant a pardon but the power now rests 
with the Minister of Justice. 
 90. R v. Bentley (deceased), [2001] 1 Cr. App. R. 21. 
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IV. THE FORENSIC REGULATOR UNIT 
There is an obvious risk of wrongful convictions with reliance upon 
unsupervised or unregulated scientists, or upon unscientific techniques. 
During an investigation a “false positive” can inculpate an innocent 
individual, while a “false negative” may mean a perpetrator will go 
undetected and can continue offending. Poor scientific and professional 
standards thus destabilises public confidence in forensic science and 
consequently has an impact upon confidence in the criminal process. 
During the massive expansion of forensic science provision in England 
and Wales in the last fifty years, there have been a series of reports 
commenting upon the provision, as well as the regulation, of forensic 
services. 
Given that many of the major miscarriages of justice of the 1980s and 
1990s had at their core flawed forensic evidence, the RCCJ looked into 
the provision of expert and scientific evidence, making thirteen 
recommendations specific to forensic science. Of these, the 
establishment of an oversight body was deemed a priority. The Report 
recommended the creation of a Forensic Science Advisory Council 
(FSAC) to serve as the regulator for the forensic science community. 
Such a Council could be a mechanism for ensuring scientific standards, 
integrity, and continuity of provision of forensic science to the criminal 
justice system. A report into serious contamination at a military forensic 
explosives laboratory by Professor Caddy in 199691 also recommended 
the creation of an “Inspectorate of Forensic Sciences” and advocated the 
registration of individuals as forensic practitioners. Reforms were not 
initiated, however, until the 1999 establishment of the Council for the 
Registration (CRFP). 
The CRFP was established to give the courts a single point of 
reference on the competence of forensic practitioners. It was to promote 
public confidence in forensic practice in the United Kingdom through 
publishing a register of competent forensic practitioners; ensuring that 
registered practitioners stayed up to date and maintained competence; 
and disciplining registered practitioners who did not meet the required 
standards of “safe, competent practice.”92 The CFRP register was 
welcomed as an important step in ensuring that those presenting 
themselves at court as expert witnesses were competent to fulfil that 
 
 91. BRIAN CADDY, ASSESSMENT AND IMPLICATIONS OF CENTRIFUGE CONTAMINATION IN THE 
TRACE EXPLOSIVES SECTION OF THE FORENSIC EXPLOSIVES LABORATORY AT FORT HALSTEAD (1996).  
 92. Applicants were required to provide details of their qualifications and experience, references 
from colleagues and users of their services, and declarations about their past and future conduct. An 
assessor from the relevant specialty reviewed a sample of their recent cases against competence criteria 
developed in association with professional bodies. Registration was granted for four years, submitting 
annual returns.  
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role. However, it stopped far short of bringing rigorous scrutiny to bear 
upon forensic science, and problems with flawed forensic and expert 
evidence continued. For example, in February 2007, Gene Morrison was 
jailed for appearing in numerous court cases as a forensic psychologist. 
Working on over 700 cases from 1977, he was found guilty of 
perverting the course of justice and perjury. He had earned over a 
quarter of a million pounds for reports that were often cut-and-pasted 
from the internet. His “qualifications” had been purchased from sham 
universities over the internet.93 In the light of financial difficulties, lack 
of stakeholder support, and the failure to prevent such problematic 
“experts,” the CRFP was closed in 2009. 
The failures of forensic science were still causing considerable 
concern throughout the short lifespan of the CRFP, whose remit was too 
restricted to have much impact upon forensic science failures. In 2002, 
four youths had been put on trial for the murder of a schoolboy named 
Damilola Taylor. All four were acquitted, leading to a reexamination of 
the police investigation and forensic exhibits, during which significant 
blood spots and fibres were found that had been overlooked during 
initial examination. A major inquiry ensued, concluding that “human 
failures” had led to the omission of vital bloodstains.94 A House of 
Commons Science and Technology Select Committee 2005 report, 
Forensic Science on Trial, made sixty recommendations on the 
regulation of forensic science, the training of scientists, and other 
pertinent issues, calling for the Government to establish a “Forensic 
Science Advisory Council” to oversee and regulate the forensic science 
market and provide independent and impartial advice on forensic 
science. After consultation, the government decided that a named 
individual would become a “Forensic Regulator,” emulating other 
regulatory structures, with the responsibility of overseeing the quality of 
forensic science in England and Wales. 
The first Forensic Regulator was appointed in 2007 and was tasked 
with establishing and monitoring quality standards, including those 
applying to national forensic science intelligence databases, and 
ensuring the accreditation of suppliers of forensic services. The 
Regulator’s Manual95 sets out requirements for all forensic science 
service providers, and the Regulator oversees accreditation (via the UK 
 
 93. Fraudulent forensic expert jailed, BBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2007), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/manchester/6386069.stm. In 2009, he was also found guilty 
on several charges relating to the rape and sexual assault of at least six young girls. Bogus Forensic 
Scientist Jailed for Child Rape, BBC NEWS (Dec. 11, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
uk_news/england/manchester/8407395.stm. 
 94. Alan Rawley and Brian Caddy, DAMILOLA TAYLOR: AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF 
FORENSIC EXAMINATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICE (2007).  
 95. Still in draft form and requiring detailed appendices. 
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Accreditation Service (UKAS)) using the international laboratory testing 
ISO17025 standard for all laboratories that supply forensic services. 
While reliance upon ISO17025 has been widely seen as appropriate, the 
standard is not specific to a forensic laboratory, necessitating 
supplementary standards and modifications to tailor the standard to 
forensic science.96 
On the one hand, the introduction of a Regulator was presented as 
creating an oversight body for forensic science providers in the UK 
based on ISO standards and “a light touch” in steering forensic service 
providers. However, with a lack of “teeth” and with gaps in regulation, 
accreditation may prove to be superficial, although the lack of a 
statutory basis and enforcement powers have not yet been deemed a 
hindrance requiring remedial legislation. Even with UKAS appending 
supplementary standards onto ISO17025 to make it forensic specific, it 
is unlikely that any standard can regulate every aspect of a forensic 
practitioner’s work. Oversight of crime scene examination and evidence 
retrieval remains very difficult, if not impossible, particularly where 
police personnel are working without external supervision. Over half of 
forensic science services (measured by cash value) in England and 
Wales are delivered within police forces’ own scientific support 
services, with this set to increase. These services are not yet subject to 
the same quality standards regimes as apply to commercial providers. 
Yet different standards increase the risk of flawed results being relied 
upon or challenged in the courts. 
At present few of the scientific processes delivered by police 
scientific support services are subject to accredited quality standards, yet 
the closure of the Forensic Science Service (FSS) in the UK and the 
budgetary crisis in the public sector are seeing police personnel 
increasingly carrying out forensic processes. A parliamentary report into 
the closure of the FSS in March 2012 has warned that the government 
did not sufficiently consider the wider implications for the criminal 
justice system of such a closure, and remarks upon the “in-house” 
provision of forensic services by the police directly: 
It is an issue of great concern that many police laboratories are not 
accredited to the same quality standards as the FSS and private sector 
providers . . . . We are of the view that the transfer of work from the FSS 
to a non-accredited police or private laboratory would be highly 
undesirable, as it would pose significant and unacceptable risks to 
criminal justice. The role of the Forensic Science Regulator is vital and 
we urge the Government to bring forward proposals to provide him with 
 
 96. The Forensic Regulation Unit, Manual of Regulation, December 2008, 9.16 (p38). 
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statutory powers to enforce compliance with quality standards.97 
The use of personnel directly employed by the police or working 
alongside police in shared premises, for example, has been denounced 
by all reports looking into forensic science. Indeed, high-profile 
miscarriages of justice in England and Wales were tainted by the 
suspicion that the police had too easily influenced scientists who were 
undertaking testing and reporting results. The UK Forensic Regulator’s 
Codes of Practice for individual forensic practitioners states that all 
practitioners be governed by the principles of “independence, 
impartiality and integrity,” but as Glidewell LJ stated in the Judith Ward 
appeal: 
For lawyers and judges a forensic scientist conjures up the image of a 
man in a white coat working in a laboratory, approaching his task with 
cold neutrality, dedicated only to the pursuit of scientific truth. It is a 
sombre thought that the reality is sometimes different . . . . Forensic 
scientists employed by the government may come to see their function as 
helping the police. They may lose their objectivity.98 
The Forensic Regulator insists that “organisational structures” do not 
hinder the goals of independence, impartiality, and integrity, but this is 
optimistic perhaps, if a scientist is employed by, or working directly 
alongside, the police. While one would wish to believe in the integrity of 
all law enforcement and forensic science personnel wherever they may 
be situated, only naivety would lead one to rely upon it. 
Thus, there is still a heavy reliance upon the integrity of the 
individual, and keen and capable supervision of their work. Yet even 
forensic scientists concede that forensic science “is not sufficiently well 
developed as a profession to have the full characteristics of a profession 
in place.”99 The expansion of the private forensic science market has 
also raised the possibility of increasing the number of “cowboys” or 
“charlatans”: (dishonest, or incompetent practitioners) and “cherry 
pickers” (companies or scientists who will undertake only ‘profitable’ 
forensic services and eschew the longer, more complex and costly 
forensic investigations). Practitioners may face pressures that are 
supposedly balanced by professionalism of the scientist, but they may 
feel under duress from customers who demand “useful” results; 
otherwise, materials can be sent to other providers, or payment for tests 
that produce “no results” can be withheld. Along with most of the public 
sector in the UK, the Regulator also faces serious resource restrictions. 
 
 97. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, THE FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICE, 2010-12, H.C. 
855, at 3 (U.K.). 
98. LJ Glidewell in R v. Ward [1993] 1 W.L.R. 619 at 674. 
 99. S. Willis, Forensic Science, Ethics and Criminal Justice, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC 
SCIENCES 523 (J.G. Fraser and Robin Williams eds., 2009).  
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Failings in the provision of expert evidence have taken place against a 
backdrop in the UK of the privatisation of forensic science provision, 
leading to even greater need for robust regulation. There is a clear need 
in a deregulated market for forensic science to avoid “bargain basement” 
forensic services that cut corners. While economic dire straits may make 
savings on scientific support attractive, the consequences of “cut-price” 
forensic services or experts should be obvious. Indeed, the UK is 
already witnessing the return of “in-sourcing” of police scientific 
support services. It does not require much trawling of the historical 
record to recount that the influence of police over “experts” was often at 
the root of flawed expertise in high-profile miscarriages of justice. With 
the police in charge of forensic evidence during an investigation, there is 
a need for accountability, with transparency paramount. 
V. CONCLUSION 
That wrongful convictions can have an enduring impact upon the 
criminal justice system is not a revelation. As this article has shown, the 
wrongful convictions of the factually innocent have played a significant 
part in achieving large-scale law reform in England and Wales. But both 
the CCRC and the Court of Appeal suffer from similar criticisms; 
despite owing their creation to the wrongly convicted factually innocent, 
both have proved to be deficient at identifying and correcting factual 
innocence claims.  
For the Court of Appeal, this deficiency is evidenced by the 
difficulties faced by those arguing fresh evidence or lurking doubt 
appeals. The Court’s approach to these appeals is not surprising given its 
lack of resources, its willingness to uphold jury verdicts in order to 
retain confidence in them, and the restrictions placed upon it by its 
review function. Consequently, its preference for due process appeals is 
easy to understand given that the task of assessing whether due process 
has been followed is much easier compared to trying to assess whether a 
person is factually innocent. Appellants, guilty or innocent, are then 
often forced to frame their appeals in technicalities. While assisting 
those who have due process failures, this lack of focus on innocence 
means that for those who do not have due process failures, fresh 
evidence and lurking doubt appeals will remain rare and difficult. An 
appeal process that allows the appeal court to assess whether the jury 
should have convicted rather than whether it could have convicted may 
provide an answer to these problems. 
These problems associated with the Court also impact on the CCRC. 
While it is accepted that the CCRC is an improvement on the previous 
government machinery for referring cases back to appeal, criticisms 
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remain that it too has proven deficient in a number of areas. Its funding 
and the number of applicants have caused significant difficulties. Yet 
whilst there are criticisms in terms of its referral rates, and its success at 
the Court of Appeal, evidence of these problems remains anecdotal and 
there is no reliable method by which to gauge whether more cases 
should have been referred back to the appeal courts. If it is true that the 
Commission has prioritised procedural and technical grounds of appeal 
over those of factual innocence (and there is no empirical evidence to 
support this) then it is somewhat understandable that the Commission in 
its subservient role will sensibly refer those cases that are more likely to 
be successful. This is not necessarily the Commission’s fault, and we 
would argue that critics should be recalibrating their aim and seeking to 
reform the Court’s illiberal approach to fresh evidence (and therefore 
factual innocence) appeals. 
A further valid criticism of it though is in respect of mission failure. 
The CCRC has not taken up (some may argue, due to lack of resources) 
the systemic role that was envisaged by the RCCJ. The Royal 
Commission did not inquire into the specific causes of individual cases 
of wrongful conviction, even though it was established in light of 
several high profile appeals. Instead, it took a much broader view and 
interpreted the Terms of Reference as seeking reforms that could 
prevent future miscarriages of justice.100 The CCRC was given a similar 
role—to use its knowledge, gained via case-work, to recommend 
systemic reforms that could prevent future miscarriages.101 However, it 
can be argued that the CCRC has yet to fulfil this part of its remit. It has 
become too “bogged down” by individual casework, and while it has 
contributed to criminal justice policy, it could do much more than it 
currently does in this respect. The CCRC then is undoubtedly an 
improvement on the Home Office in seeking to address miscarriages of 
justice in the Court of Appeal, but there does not appear to be any 
quantifiable evidence that it has achieved anything by way of 
prevention. If the CCRC is unwilling or unable to accept this wider 
remit, then this “slack” should be picked up by another body. This 
potentially explains the rise in Innocence Projects in England and 
Wales, which provide a platform in which innocence arguments can be 
heard and calls for reform made.102 
 
100. Of course, many have argued that the RCCJ failed in this mission itself.  
101. It was stated in the RCCJ report, supra note 15 chapter ten ¶ 22, that ‘we think it is important 
that the [Commission] should also be able to draw attention in its [annual report] to general features of 
the criminal justice system which it had found unsatisfactory in the course of its work, and to make any 
recommendations for change it thinks fit.’ 
102. For a discussion on the relationship between Innocence Projects and the CCRC in England 
and Wales, see S. Roberts and L. Weathered, The Contradictions and Compatibility of Innocence 
Projects and the Criminal Cases Review Commission, 29(1) OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 1 (2009). 
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The legal engineering then undertaken in England and Wales in 
creating the Court of Appeal and the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission has resulted in two bodies that seek to overturn 
miscarriages of justice, albeit with only partial success, with both in 
need of reform and extra resourcing if they are going to succeed and 
take a preventative role, too. The only significant body that has a wholly 
preventative remit (which has no real role—as yet—in overturning 
miscarriages of justice) is the Forensic Regulator. However, the 
preventative role of the Regulator is seriously limited by under-
resourcing and a lack of powers. It may also yet lead to a false sense of 
security with legal professionals relying upon the validity and veracity 
of scientific evidence that in effect is still poorly regulated. 
The forensic market in England and Wales remains in turmoil, with 
serious limitations to any guarantees that forensic evidence will not play 
a role in any future miscarriages of justice. Placing the Regulator on a 
statutory footing may assist, but unless the Regulator is given a 
considerably widened remit and strong powers in conjunction with legal 
reforms that limit the admission of flawed scientific evidence into the 
courts, then this body will fail to have a critical impact upon 
miscarriages of justice. 
The Forensic Regulator holds only a detached position with respect to 
the criminal process. However, the Regulator was appointed in light of 
miscarriages of justice as a preventative measure, yet it has resulted in 
only a partial attempt to guarantee no further convictions will be marred 
by flawed science. Many other developments in the forensic science 
market are presently working against this aim and could be increasing 
the risk of miscarriages of justice. The result could be that the Court of 
Appeal and CCRC are going to be put under greater strain in the future 
because the body trying to prevent miscarriages of justice is hamstrung 
by a lack of powers and limited remit, and developments in the criminal 
justice process in the previous decade have seen due process protections 
diminished and risks of flawed evidence increased. 
England and Wales has then turned to incremental reforms to try and 
maintain, or strengthen due process protections. Yet the “law and order” 
rhetoric has most often triumphed, resulting in the diminishment of due 
process protections. This contrasts with the U.S., where work on 
exonerations has expanded to include policy formation and lobbying, 
which has led to significant policy and legislative changes across many 
states to protect the innocent from conviction. In England and Wales the 
route taken concentrates upon due process instead of “innocence.” This 
in itself is not to be criticised, because the pursuit of justice is assisted 
by such due process protections and encompasses justice for the guilty 
at the same time as protecting the innocent. Due process is important for 
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maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system and securing 
public confidence. It does, however, entail difficulties for those innocent 
individuals who may fall through the many cracks, as the system still 
functions poorly to assist them postconviction. While there could be 
modifications to current bodies and processes to make them more 
conducive to recognising and swiftly addressing miscarriages of justice, 
we suggest the bodies remain focussed on due process because of the 
extra benefits offered by this approach. The rights of the guilty matter, 
too, and due process protections also protect the innocent. There must 
not be a blinkered focus on the innocent; it is far better to concentrate 
efforts on seeing that all individuals are being convicted lawfully: “This 
razor focus on the wrongful convictions of people who had nothing to 
do with the crime dilutes the spectrum of other reasons why people are 
wrongly convicted.”103 
It appears in this instance, that the phrase “mission accomplished” can 
be attributed the same meaning as that surely intended by President 
George W. Bush on the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft 
carrier during the Iraq War. England and Wales have made significant 
advances and have made commendable progress in addressing 
miscarriages of justice. However, there is still much to achieve, and it 
may take years and further turmoil before the institutions are optimised 
and their operations refined. Until such time, perseverance with reform 
efforts and vigilance remain essential to ensure that miscarriages of 
justice do not continue to blight the criminal justice system.  
  
 
 103. E. Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (2011). 
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